Slowly but surely, industry is discovering the need for programming languages, runtime environments and methodologies adapted to collaborative and distributed computing platforms. However, current distributed platforms, whether industrial or academic, are generally fragile with respect to resource exhaustion, and can provide, at best, ad hoc solutions to counter accidents or Denial of Service attacks. In this paper, we examine the problem of resource management in Erlang, that is providing services for distant use, while ensuring that untrusted third-parties using the services may not cause the exhaustion of memory, file handles or other limited resources. For this, we use Targettable/Extendable π-Calculus specification language and provide a formal semantics for a subset of Core Erlang, as well as a model of some of its library. From these models, we derive a type system for formally guaranteeing robustness of services with respect to Denial of Service attacks.
INTRODUCTION
In the course of the last decades, the landscape of computing has seen a gradual change from purely hierarchical organisations to distributed teams, or even distributed groups of agents, cooperating through decentralised applications, information repositories, online services and now web applications. All these forms of collaborative computing offer numerous opportunities and require new tools and new manners of thinking. In turn, the new tools open the doors to numerous new weaknesses with respect to security and robustness. Indeed, even clean languages designed for distribution, such as Erlang [1] or the strongly-typed JoCaml [2] or Nomadic Pict [3] , have little in the manner of protection against malicious or ill-programmed agents. Of concern, for instance, are Denial-of-Service attacks: can an attacker cause a service to expend all its memory, to open more files than the operating system can handle or to use up all the paper available for its printers ? While dynamic techniques exist -and are included in most modern operating systems and virtual machines -to watch the consumption of resources and terminate ill-behaved processes, they are typically not defined formally, apply to only a specific set of resources, and may only detect these resource-exhausting processes when it is too late, especially when the resources under attack are limited and cannot be deallocated. The alternative is to analyse agents at compile-time or launchtime and execute only that do not exhaust resources. This work presents a step in the development of a resourcesafe Erlang, in which both results would be achievable. Erlang is a concurrent, dynamically typed, distributed, purely functional programming language, widely used in the world of telecommunications. While Erlang is not an implementation of formal semantics, several attempts have been made at formalising the semantics of Erlang, either directly [4] or by translating it into π-calculus [5] . We use and extend this last work to offer a denotational semantics of Core Erlang in Teπc [6] , a targettable/extendable π-calculus. In addition to capturing the computational behaviour of Erlang, this encoding allows us to observe the resource usage of a program, hence to define a dynamic notion of resource exhaustion and potentially to detect Denial-of-Service attacks. For instance, let us consider the following Erlang extract:
l o g f r a g i l e ( I t e m ) −> l e t F i l e = open ( " l o g " ) i n w r i t e ( F i l e , I t e m ) , c l o s e ( F i l e ) .
Listing 1. Resource Manipulation with Erlang
The program defines a service log fragile, for use by any agent over the network, whose role it is to write items in a file. The opening of this file is an action which may require resources, such as some space in the file allocation table or some reading privileges. If it is executed, statement write(file, item) will run in an environment where these resources are referenced by file. Eventually, once the item has been written to the file, that file is closed. Finally, depending on the resources involved, this closing may allow the system to recover some or all of the resources -resources such as memory may be fully recovered while credentials or access logs are more complex.
As it turns out, if the number of files opened at any given time is a critical resource, then this service happens to be fragile: since there is no synchronisation between instances of the service, a malicious agent only has to fork and call log fragile often enough to eventually reach such a state in which resource "file handler" is exhausted.
In Teπc, one could model the opening of this file as a transition i −→ * (νf ile = F ile())j, where i is the body of log fragile and j is the remainder of the operations after the opening, that is writing and closing. This transition marks the fact that, while i is executed in an empty environment, j runs with a reference f ile to some resource F ile. Conversely, closing the file is marked by a transition such as (νf ile = F ile())k −→ * l. In particular, the resource usage of these processes differs. If the system is only able to maintain n open files at any given time, a process such as (νf
is exhausting the system's resources and should be stopped. By opposition, the following listing presents a trivial robust manager for the service, which can be called any number of times and will never use more than one file 1 : 
Listing 2. Safe Resource Manipulation with Erlang
The objective of this work is to formalise the difference between the manners of managing resources used in log fragile and log robust, to model resource exhaustion and to provide formally proved tools for guaranteeing a service with respect to Denial of Service attacks. In Section 2, we present Teπc, which we use in Section 3 as the domain of a denotational semantics of a subset of Core Erlang. In Section 4, we make use of this encoding to provide a static type system to guarantee the robustness of a program. We then conclude by an overview of related works and future developments. Due to space constraints, this document only presents a high-level overview of our work. Technical information, including formal semantics, is available as a companion technical report report [7] . 1 Note that the syntax of Core Erlang is somewhat different from that of Erlang/OTP. This extract complies with the former.
ABOUT TEπC
Teπc, the targettable/extendable π-calculus, is an extension of the controlled π-calculus [8] , itself a variant of the π-calculus [9] , a formal language designed for modelling and studying concurrent and distributed systems with dynamic reconfigurations. To this base, the controlled π-calculus adds a notion of resources and resource limitations. In turn, Teπc introduces notions of foreign operations and foreign values, used to model underlying virtual machine or operating system calls. Numerous aspects of Teπc are left parametric, so as to allow targetting Teπc for the modelling of specific systems. . The main concepts of Teπc are names (references to foreign values and to communication channels), processes (the state of a system or subsystem), instructions (the code for a system or subsystem), foreign operations (calls to primitives of the operating system/virtual machine), foreign values (results of foreign operations, e.g. file handlers), resources (e.g. amounts of memory) and deallocation of names. In particular, note that, as in the π-calculus, every branching, flow control structure or function call is modelled as a sequence of messages along communication channels, possibly accompanied by foreign operations. The extracts of figure 1 demonstrate the definition and usage of a service if then else in Teπc. Equations 1, 2 and 3 specify the behaviour of a foreign operation If T henElse inside the virtual machine: if e is a foreign value and a and b are two names, after one or more steps of reduction, foreign operation If T henElsee, a, b will produce either foreign value a or foreign value b, depending on the result of the evaluation of e. Teπc code on if then else e a b do ... defines a service, listening for requests on channel if then else. When invoked, this service calls foreign operation If T henElse, binds the result to name go and sends a message along this channel go. Conversely, Teπc code spawn ... spawns three processes: once a do ... is a continuation on a, expecting a message along channel a before proceeding, once b do is a continuation on b, expecting a message along channel b before proceeding and if then else true a b invokes service if then else, hence eventually causing the emission of an empty message on channel a, hence the release on the continuation on a. Due to space constraints, we only present the following definitions informally.
Informal definition 1 (Exhaustion) If a process P could evolve into a process Q but is prevented from doing so by the absence of free resources in the system, we write that transition from P to Q is exhausting. Conversely, we write that P is non-exhausting if P can be executed within the resource limitations of the system, if no evolution of P is
Specification of foreign operations
Teπc service on i f t h e n e l s e e a b do f o r e i g n go = I f T h e n E l s e ( e , a , b ) i n go f o r e i g n t r u e = T r u e f o r e i g n f a l s e = F a l s e −− spawn once a do . . . and once b do . . . and i f t h e n e l s e t r u e a b In the rest of this paper, we will consider informally a set of resources, forming the reserve of the system. In this model, foreign operations and foreign values may use some of these resources, which may later be freed by deallocations.
Informal definition 2 (Client process) An process P is client (or unpriviledged) if no resources from the system are allocated to P and if any evolution of P remains a client process.
Informally, a client process is a process which cannot directly allocate resources inside the system, although it may possibly cause a privileged process to do so. Typically, processes which are not part of the implementation of the operating system/virtual machine are unprivileged, as they need to request the operating system to allocate resources for them. For instance, assuming for a second that foreign operation If T henElse uses resources, process on if then else e a b do ... is privileged, while process if then else true a b is not. In particular, we will consider that all potential Denial-of-Service attackers are client processes, as they may not allocate resources of the system directly.
Informal definition 3 (Robustness) A process P is robust with respect to denials of service attacks if, for any client process Q, P |Q is a non-exhausting process.
FROM ERLANG TO TEπC
In this section, we introduce Teπc-Erlang, the encoding of a subset of Core Erlang [10] by translation to Teπc. This encoding is a vastly enriched superset of π-Erlang [5] , and the core model we use in this work as a definition of the semantics of Erlang 2 As space constraints do not permit it, we cannot present Erlang itself in this document. Rather, the bibliography suggests further readings [10] on the subject for the interested reader. As any language definition in Teπc, the specification of Teπc-Erlang involves the following steps: defining the vocabulary of foreign values and foreign operations, the semantics of foreign operations, the semantics of garbagecollection and -at last -the encoding of Erlang expressions in Teπc. To this, we add a model of a few functions/services of Erlang's standard library, including representation of primitive values, process spawning, some aspects of exceptions, mutexes, some file management, etc. In order to ensure some clarity of the coding, we make sure that these services are the only privileged processes on the system. In addition, so as to permit controlling the number of processes being spawned, we make sure that each process holds a reference to a foreign value, which we will take into account during the analysis of resource usage, in Section 4.
. As in π-Erlang, we do not model Erlang's primop (i.e. calls to implementation-dependent primitives which may depend on the whole state of the system and/or have side effects), links (i.e. process failures), module attributes, or module importation. Also, as in π-Erlang we ignore the order of clauses in a case statement. From this definition of Teπc-Erlang, we may encode the example log fragile as:
on l o g f r a g i l e i t e m r e s s e l f do new r e s ' i n spawn new r e s 1 i n spawn s t r i n g " l o g " r e s 1 s e l f and once r e s 1 x do open x r e s ' s e l f and once r e s ' x do new r e s ' ' i n new r e s 1 , r e s 2 i n spawn r e s 1 x and r e s 2 i t e m and once r e s 1 x 1 do once r e s 2 x 2 do w r i t e x 1 x 2 r e s ' ' s e l f and once r e s ' ' do new r e s 3 i n spawn r e s 3 x and once r e s 3 x 3 do c l o s e x3 r e s s e l f
Listing 3. The fragile log, in Tepic
Note that we have not yet specified the nature of resources. Indeed, while guaranteeing that an Erlang service is robust with respect to Denial-of-Service requires a precise definition of which resources are critical and what operations require such resources, neither the specifications of Erlang nor the translation to Teπc define resource constraints. For instance, it is imaginable that an implementation of Erlang for Linux-based embedded systems could use one Linux kernel thread for each Erlang thread. This implementation would be limited to the simultaneous execution of a few hundred threads, by opposition to the nearly-limitless concurrency of the standard distribution of Erlang/OTP. Similarly, an Erlang program running on sensor networks will be faced with the problems of managing energy reserves, whereas the critical resources for an application server would presumably be memory or bandwidth. In our example, assuming that we are only interested in file handlers, and that channels, strings, lists and tuples do not require resources, service log fragile, once encoded, defines a non-exhausting process. We obtain similar results for log robust. By examining the encoding of log fragile and log robust, however, we may notice, again, that it is easy to trick log fragile into opening any number of files, hence making it non-robust, while log robust may only open one file at any time. We will now formalise and mechanise this reasoning and introduce a proof system to prove stronger properties.
PROVING RESOURCE-SAFETY
In this section, we introduce a type system designed to produce proofs of robustness of Erlang programs compiled in Teπc. As the encoding itself, this type system is parametrised by the set of resources. This type system is designed to recognise a number of orthogonal patterns: resource allocation, concurrent composition, exclusive choice, resource finalisation, resource transmission and loss of control. The first pattern is resource allocation. An instruction foreign a = E() in i requires more resources to be execute than i, as it needs to store the result of foreign operation E() -regardless of whether these resources are eventually deallocated. The second pattern is concurrent composition. If two processes P and Q must be executed purely concurrently (i.e. without synchronisations), the system must have enough resources to permit any scheduling of P and Q. By opposition, if only one of two processes P and Q is to be executed, the system only needs enough resources to execute this process. Finalisation of resources permits safely reusing deallocated resources: in a process such as P foreign a = F inalize(b) in i | foreign a = F inalize(b) in j, both i and j are triggered only after the deallocation of resources allocated to b. The resources allocated to a must, however, be shared between i and j. Another pattern is that of runtime resource transmission: the amount of resources required for the execution of a service depends on what happens whenever the service is invoked, as well as on how many times the service is indeed invoked. In our analysis, this translates to a static cost in resources, charged to callers whenever they invoke the service. Finally, loss of control permits interaction with untyped processes. Informally, if a channel a may be used to communicate with the outside world, the typed process shouldn't expect any resource transfer on a, shouldn't make any assumption about references received from a, and shouldn't expect that references sent on a will be properly used. In other words, a should be considered "untrusted". By searching for these patterns, the type system extracts a set of linear inequations upon the set of resources being manipulated.
Informal definition 4 (Isolation)
A set of channels Γ is said to isolate process Q if and only if, for any channel name a known to Q, Γ specifies that a is untrusted.
In other words, Q is isolated if the hypothesis used by the type system correctly labels any communication with Q world as untrusted.
Informal theorem 1 (Well-typed programs are robust) If we consider a system with a reserve of resources reserve, if P is a process and Γ a set of channels isolating P and if our type systems may prove that, within Γ, P has type Bound(reserve, ⊥ N ), then P is robust.
This main theorem is a corollary of a more generic property of "subject reduction under attack", stating that a typable process remains typed, even in presence of untypable attackers.
Informal theorem 2 (Inference)
For any set of resources such that (constructive) satisfiability of sets of linear inequations is decidable, type inference is decidable.
Corollary 1 (Examples)
It is easy to prove that the encoding of log fragile may never be typed in an isolating environment. Informally, an isolating environment requires that name log fragile may not charge resources to callers -as these callers are not trusted to deliver the resources -while message open requires one file handler at each call. As there is no synchronisation between instances of this service, it is not sure that file handlers may be finalised and reused between instances. Conversely, typing the encoding of log robust is possible in an isolating environment and yields a proof that the service will use at most one file handler, no matter how many instances are being executed. Informally, these instances synchronise through the shared lock and may therefore finalise and reuse one common file handler.
Note that it is easy to write more complex type-checked resource-bounded loops, for more complex sets of resources. For instance, it is quite possible to have several services share resources, as long as they have some manner of synchronising upon their common heap of resources. For more examples, see [8] .
CONCLUSION
This work is part of an ongoing work on the application of process calculi to operating system-level problems. Using Teπc, we have formalised the semantics of a large fragment of Core Erlang, as well as the usage of resources by an Erlang program, a notion of resource exhaustion and of robustness with respect to Denial-of-Service attacks. We have then produced a proof technique to guarantee that an Erlang program and run-time environment is robust, and applied this technique to a few simple examples. Our encoding of Core Erlang is not complete, in particular with respect to error-handling, physical locations or migrations. In particular, the examples used throughout this document made use of a simplified version of some library functions, so as to avoid error management. Similarly, it is difficult to impose a static type system to a dynamically typed (indeed, in some circumstances, sometimes weakly typed) programming language. Our type system is itself therefore limited, in particular with respect to polymorphism, pattern-matching or process-to-process communication. However, we believe that our work is promising, and that it should be possible to extend it to a useful subset of Erlang -or other languages for concurrency and distribution. Indeed, we are currently working on a more generic type system for Teπc, with polymorphism and dependent types, which we hope will be able to remove most of the current restrictions and to extend the degree of control to other aspects of resource-management, and on the integration of real-time constraints in Teπc, which we hope will be applicable to Erlang programs.
Teπc-Erlang is directly related to π-Erlang [5] , which it extends. Other attempts have been made to formalise Erlang, using operational semantics rather than encoding [4] , [11] . While these last works are more complete, they are also more self-contained and harder to extend in a convincing manner to model resource usage or non-well-behaved agents. Other type systems have also been offered for Erlang [12] , [13] , [14] but with objectives distant from resource management and have, to the best of our knowledge, no proof of subject reduction. A few languages and models have been designed to permit control of resources. Camelot [15] is a variant of ML with safe explicit deallocation of memory, in which the type system is able to infer bounds on memory usage. While this type system may express more precise bounds than ours, it is limited to memory and the language is strictly nonconcurrent. Similarly, the ULM model [16] permits the description of systems from the point of view of their resource consumption, but in a strongly synchronous model, which prevents modelling any form of multitasking and without any management of resource deallocation. Finally, some works on process algebras [17] [18]or on the λ-calculus [19] attempt to provide a formalisation of resource control, but either require much more abstract settings or fail to take into account concurrency or deallocation of resources. In particular, none of these languages or models provides a formalisation of Denial of Service attacks or a notion of resisting to such attacks. Teπc itself is also related to the Applied π-calculus [20] . While both formalism is intended for proofs of protocols, its design makes it more adapted to the examination of cryptography and less to the examination of resource-related properties, in particular resource limitations, which are at the core of our work. Teπc is a work in progress. In addition to completing the encoding of Teπc-Erlang and to improving the type system and adding real-time constraints, we intend to work on the extraction of Teπc into Erlang, with guarantees of preservation of the semantics and types of programs. We also intend to merge our work on resources, foreign operations and foreign values to the ongoing development of the Kell platform [21] , a process algebra/language/virtual machine designed for the construction of component-based distributed applications.
